In this non-compete case, the trial court entered an order enjoining defendants from soliciting plaintiffs’ “current or prospective clients” who practiced in the area of orthopedic medicine. The order did not specify the duration of the restriction. The Fourth District reversed and remanded, holding that Rule 1.610(c) requires that the order define the referenced “clients” more specifically and that a time restriction be specified in the injunction.
In this duo of cases, the 5th DCA stated that an Order is not final until it is (1) written, (2) signed, and (3) filed with the clerk of the trial court. Here the written order was stamped by the Judge, but not sent to the Clerk for entry. As such, the DCA lacked jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 9.110(b).
The Court takes the further opportunity to gently chastise the trial courts in both cases, stating: “Some basis for the ruling would be instructive both to the parties and this Court.” Ouch. The 5th DCA is obviously getting frustrated with the foreclosure cases it is seeing.
Pursuant to Rule 1.420(e), it was reversible error for Court to dismiss lawsuit for lack of prosecution a mere 31-days after required notice of no activity.
In this case, defendant moved to vacate a default on the basis that plaintiff improperly used substitute service to serve the complaint. The trial court denied the motion. The appellate court affirmed, holding that defendant’s continued inaccessibility at his residence obviated the need for defendant to be served personally.
In this motorcycle injury case, the trial court found that plaintiff’s counsel had engaged in misconduct throughout the trial but nonetheless denied defendant’s motion for new trial. The trial court reasoned that because defense counsel did not move for a mistrial after the court had sustained various objections, the defense had waived any right to a new trial. The trial court ruled further that under the circumstances the defense could not show that “failure to grant a new trial would undermine the public’s confidence in the justice system.” The Second District reversed and held that the trial court used the wrong standard, stating that the trial court “only needed to consider whether opposing counsel’s misconduct deprived the [defendant] of a fair trial. Having found that it did, the trial court should have granted the City’s motion.”